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THE CURIOUS CASE OF CLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION: 
LAW OF THE CASE, DISCRETIONARY REVIEW, AND THE 
DILEMMA FACING OHIO ATTORNEYS 
Jason Snyder* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction, a disappointed bidder 
lost a city contract regarding the expansion of the City Convention 
Center.  Cleveland Construction, Inc. (Cleveland) was the lowest 
bidder for the contract, but the City of Cincinnati (Cincinnati) 
awarded the contract to Valley Interior Systems (Valley) on the 
grounds that Valley‘s bid was the ―lowest and best bid.‖
1
  Unlike 
Cleveland, Valley had complied with the contract‘s requirement that 
35% of all subcontractors included in a bid be small businesses as 
part of the City‘s Small Business Enterprise Program (SBE Program). 
Cleveland filed suit alleging that Cincinnati had violated 
Cincinnati Ohio Municipal Code § 3-321-37(c)(4),
2
 which places a 
cap on the difference between the lowest bid that satisfies the 
requirements that make it ―best,‖ and the actual lowest bid.
3
  Thus, 
according to Cleveland, Cincinnati had violated Cleveland‘s due 
process rights because Cincinnati did not have discretion to award the 
contract to Valley when Cleveland was the lowest bidder.  Cleveland 
also alleged that Cincinnati‘s SBE Program was a sham cover for 
impermissible gender-based and race-based quota systems; therefore, 




 * Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37 (2010) (requiring the City to award a 
contract to the ―lowest and best bid‖ and giving the City discretion in determining what constitutes the 
―best‖ bid). 
 2. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37(c)(4) 
(2010).  As will be discussed in Part III infra, this limitation only applies when the factor that 
determines the ―best‖ bid is compliance with City‘s Small Business Enterprise Outreach Program. 
 3. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-321-37(c)(4) (requiring the City to award a 
contract to the lowest bidder if the bidder that would be ―lowest and best‖ is more than 10% or $50,000 
higher than the lowest bid). 
 4. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 
1
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City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction involved two 
interesting and oft-discussed constitutional questions: (1) whether a 
disappointed bidder for a government contract has a property interest 
in the contract such that due process is violated if the government 
awards the contract to another bidder, and (2) whether a government 
business outreach program directed at minority- or gender-owned 
businesses triggers strict judicial review.  This Casenote will not 
focus on either of those issues.  Instead, it will focus on a more 
important issue that arose out of the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s 
decision in Cleveland Construction, namely, how the law of the case 
doctrine and discretionary review of limited issues by a court of last 
resort forces attorneys into an unenviable dilemma: either expend 
precious time and effort arguing issues not accepted for review or 
risk having those issues decided without argument. 
This Casenote will begin, in Part II, by setting out the relevant 
parts of the Cincinnati Municipal Code, namely, the portions related 
to Cincinnati‘s SBE and SBO Programs.  Part II will also survey the 
Ohio case law that lays out the law of the case doctrine.  Part III will 
provide an analysis of City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction, 
Inc., the lower court decisions that brought it to the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, and the case‘s subsequent history.  Part IV will then argue that, 
under the law of the case doctrine, the lower courts correctly found 
that the Supreme Court of Ohio had decided the case in its entirety, 
leaving Cleveland with no surviving equal protection claim. 
The decision illustrates the dilemma facing attorneys arguing 
before the court.  In other words, when the Supreme Court of Ohio 
grants discretionary review on limited issues in a case, attorneys must 
wager space in their brief, time at oral argument, and effort doing 
research on whether the court will limit its decision to only those 
issues for which review was granted or not.  If an attorney determines 
that the court will not limit its decision and the court does, then the 
time and effort is lost.  If an attorney bets that the court will limit its 
decision and the court does not, those claims for which the court did 
not grant review may be lost.  In Part V, this Casenote will conclude 
by arguing that the solution to this dilemma is for the court to amend 
 
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005). 
2
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Ohio Supreme Court Rule 3.6 and reject the practice of accepting 
only limited issues when it grants discretionary review.
5
  Therefore, 
this Casenote begins where the Supreme Court ended, with 
―judgment [ ] entered for the city.‖
6
 
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES 
A. The Cincinnati Municipal Code 
City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction deals with the 
interplay of relatively complicated municipal ordinances.  Therefore, 
a brief explanation of Cincinnati‘s SBE program and Subcontracting 
Outreach programs (SO programs) is necessary.  Ordinances 
regarding the procurement of Cincinnati‘s contracts are laid out in 
Title III Cincinnati Municipal Code (CMC) Chapter 321, while the 
SBE program itself is set out in Title III CMC Chapter 323. 
Like all municipal corporations in Ohio, the majority of 
Cincinnati‘s contracts must be awarded through a bidding process.
7
  
CMC 321-37(a) requires that Cincinnati awards contracts to the 
―lowest and best bidder.‖
8
  However, Cincinnati has great discretion 
in determining what makes a bid ―best.‖  Some of the discretion is 
self-limiting; CMC 321-37(b), for example, allows Cincinnati to 
award a contract to a bidder who does not submit the lowest bid but 
uses recycled materials as long as the bid is less than $10,000 or 3% 
higher an otherwise qualified, lower bid.
9
  Other factors used to 
 
 5. OHIO S. CT. PRACTICE R. 3.6 (West 2010) (providing that ―If the appeal is a discretionary 
appeal asserting a question of public or great general interest, the Supreme Court will either: (a) 
[d]ecline jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits; or (b) [g]rant jurisdiction to hear the case on the 
merits, accepting the appeal, and either order the case or limited issues in the case to be briefed and 
heard on the merits or enter judgment summarily.‖). 
 6. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ohio 2008).  This note 
will use the unconventional short cite of ―City of Cincinnati‖ to distinguish the Ohio Supreme Court 
case from the lower court cases which will use the short cite ―Cleveland Construction.‖  This 
differentiation is for note cases only; in the main text this case will, unless otherwise unclear, refer to the 
Ohio Supreme Court case as Cleveland Construction. 
 7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.011 (West 2010). 
 8. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37 (2010). 
 9. Id. 
3
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determine the best bid have fewer limitations; CMC 321-37(c)(1) and 
(2) allow Cincinnati to use information regarding a contractor‘s past 
performance and payment of a prevailing wage. 
Two factors that go into the best bid calculation stem from the 
City‘s SBE Program.  The SBE Program allows businesses that meet 
certain criteria for size and income to register as SBEs with 
Cincinnati, thereby receiving benefits when bidding on Cincinnati 
contracts.
10
  One of these benefits is that SBE status is a factor in 
determining the best bid; bidders for Cincinnati contracts are required 
to use SBE subcontractors for a certain percentage of the contract, as 
determined by the City.
11
 
The SBE Program also sets goals for minority- and female-owned 
business (so-called MBEs and WBEs) participation, which is tracked 
and reported internally by Cincinnati as part of the SO Program.
12
  
The purpose of the SO Program is to meet the MBE/WBE goals set 
out in the SBE Program.  Finally, the SBE Program requires the 
Cincinnati City Manager to promulgate rules for the SO Program.
13
 
According to the City Manager‘s SBE and SO rules, compliance 
with the SBE and SO Programs are factors that Cincinnati uses to 
determine the best bid.  At the discretion of Cincinnati, a bidder that 
fails to comply with the SBE program may be disqualified from the 
award.
14
  Cincinnati may also disqualify a bidder for failure to make 
a good faith effort to comply with the SO Program, subject to the 
limitation that the lowest bid that does comply with the SO Program 
is less than $50,000 or 10% higher than the bid of the disqualified 
bidder.
15
  Thus, a bidder‘s failure to comply with the SO Program 
gives the city discretion subject to a price cap limitation, while a 
bidder‘s failure to meet the SBE Program gives the city discretion 
with no limitation. 
 
 10. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 323-1-S (2011). 
 11. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 323-7 (noting the annual goals for all city contracts 
is 30%, but individual contracts may vary depending on the availability of SBEs for that type of 
contract). 
 12. Id. (noting the annual goals for MBEs and WBEs are 30% of all SBEs used in construction 
contracts). 
 13. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 323-31. 
 14. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37(c)(4). 
 15. Id. 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/9
2011] CASENOTE—CURIOUS CASE OF CLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION 321 
B. The Law of the Case Doctrine 
The law of the case doctrine ―provides that the decision of a 
reviewing court in a case remains the law of the case on the legal 
questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both 
the trial and reviewing levels.‖
16
  While the doctrine is not ―a binding 
rule of substantive law,‖ it is ―necessary to ensure consistency of 
results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling issues, and to 
preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by 
the Ohio Constitution.‖
17
  Therefore, ―Absent extraordinary 
circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme 
Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of 
a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.‖
18
 
Most commonly, the doctrine applies when an appellate court 
remands a case for further proceedings.  On remand, the trial court 
cannot exceed the mandate of the reviewing court; that is, it may only 
consider the issues that the appellate court remanded and those that 
the trial court did not decide prior to the appeal.  Any issues decided 
by the trial court before the appeal and not the subject of the appeal 
are outside the mandate and may not be reconsidered. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with such a situation in Nolan v. 
Nolan.
19
  In Nolan, a wife brought a divorce action against her 
husband.  At trial, all issues were decided, including a division of the 
family home, and an entry of final decree.
20
  Both parties appealed, 
and the court remanded the case for further proceedings to decide 
which party actually occupied the family home.
21
  On remand, the 
trial court restructured the entire agreement and made no findings as 
to occupancy.
22
  The court of appeals affirmed this new decree by the 
trial court.  The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, however, on the 
grounds that the trial court exceeded the mandate given by the court 
 
 16. Nolan v. Nolan, 462 N.E.2d 410, 412–413 (Ohio 1984). 
 17. Id. 
 18. State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam). 
 19. Nolan, 462 N.E.2d 410. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 413. 
5
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of appeals because the remand order was only for findings on 
occupancy.
23
  According to the court, ―[P]ermit[ting] the trial court to 
so markedly deviate from the basis of the remand would defeat the 
aforementioned purposes of the doctrine of the law of the case, 
particularly that of consistency of result.‖
24
 
The doctrine, however, also applies to subsequent appeals.  Thus, 
an appellate court cannot reconsider an issue already decided by an 
equivalent court.  For example, early in a lawsuit against a 
municipality, the trial court will decide if the government is entitled 
to sovereign immunity.  If the trial court rules that sovereign 
immunity does not apply and the city appeals the ruling, the court of 
appeals settles the issue.  If the appellate court affirms the trial 
court‘s decision, the parties proceed to trial, and the plaintiff wins, 
the court of appeals cannot reconsider the issue of sovereign 
immunity when the municipality appeals the final judgment.
25
 
The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a similar issue in State ex 
rel. Sharif v. McDonnell.
26
  In Sharif, Judge McDonnell refused to 
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law because Sharif had 
untimely filed for post-conviction relief.
27
  Sharif appealed the 
dismissal, and the court of appeals dismissed pursuant to Ohio 
Revised Code § 2953.21 and ordered ―once the trial court issues 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, appellant may file an 
appeal.‖
28
  Sharif again requested Judge McDonnell issue findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, and again Judge McDonnell refused.
29
  
Sharif then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the court of 
appeals to compel Judge McDonnell to issue the findings.
30
  The 
same panel of the court of appeals granted the writ and affirmed ―that 
R.C. 2953.21 did not appear to require Judge McDonnell to issue 
 
 23. Id. at 413–14. 
 24. Id. at 414. 
 25. Note, the doctrine only applies to an equivalent court and does not apply to higher courts.  
Thus, a court of appeals sitting en banc or a court of last resort would not be bound by the law of the 
case doctrine.  
 26. State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam).  
 27. Id. at 129. 
 28. Id. at 128. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
6
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findings of fact and conclusions of [sic] law because Sharif had not 
timely filed his petition.  The court, nevertheless, ruled that the law-
of-the-case doctrine required Judge McDonnell to issue these 
findings and conclusions.‖
31
  In affirming the court of appeals, the 
court, quoting Nolan, held ―a trial court must ‗follow the mandate, 
whether correct or incorrect, of the Court of Appeals.‘‖
32
 
Further, according to the law of the case doctrine, if the Supreme 
Court of Ohio does not expressly issue a remand order, then there is 
no remand order.
33
  In Lewis, the Court noted: 
We crafted our language in the [] mandate to order that the trial court 
carry this judgment into execution.  We did not remand the cause for 
further proceedings.  See R.C. 2505.39 (―A court that reverses or affirms 
a final order, judgment, or decree of a lower court upon appeal on 
questions of law, shall not issue execution, but shall send a special 
mandate to the lower court for execution or further proceedings‖ 
[emphasis added]).  In fact, if we had intended a remand for further 




Therefore, if the Supreme Court does not expressly issue a remand 
order, the mandate to the trial court is to enter judgment as ordered, 
even if the court was incorrect in not issuing a remand order. 
Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 3.6 relates to the law of the 
case doctrine.  According to Rule 3.6, in cases of great public interest 
or concern, the court may accept a whole case for review, accept 
limited issues in a case for review, or enter judgment summarily.
35
 
III. CITY OF CINCINNATI V. CLEVELAND CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
In December 2003, the City of Cincinnati (Cincinnati) issued an 
invitation to bid on various contracts for construction projects as part 
of the Cincinnati Convention Center.  For the drywall contract, the 
city required all bids to have 35% of the subcontracts awarded to 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam). 
 33. State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ohio 2003). 
 34. Id. 
 35. OHIO S. CT. PRACTICE R. 3.6. 
7
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businesses registered under the city‘s SBE Program; thus, the 
contract would go to the lowest bid that met the SBE requirement, 
(i.e. the ―lowest and best bid.‖)
36
  As part of the SBE Program, the 
city included information on Cincinnati‘s SO Program.  The SO 
Program informs contractors of Cincinnati‘s goals for minority- and 
woman-owned subcontractors (so-called MBEs and WBEs), 
estimates the percentage of MBEs and WBEs that could participate in 
the contract, and requires contractors to make a good faith effort to 
reach these estimates as part of the SBE Program or risk having their 
bid rejected.
37
  While, according to the SO Program rules, the city 
has discretion to reject bids, the city maintained that it has never 
considered a contractor‘s failure to meet the participation goals of the 
SO Program when rejecting a contractor‘s bid as non-compliant 
under the SBE Program.
38
  Further, CMC 321-37 provides that if the 
primary factor in determining the lowest and best bid on a city 
contract is the SO requirements, then the city may impose a $50,000 
or 15% higher price cap and award the contract to the next qualified 
bid.
39
  The Convention Center drywall contract for subcontractors 
estimated the availability of 13.09% minority and 1.05% female.
40
 
Initially, Cincinnati received three bids for the drywall contract, a 
bid from Valley Interior Systems with 34% SBE participation that 
 
 36. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37. 
 37. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005). 
 38. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37 (―If . . . evaluation determines that a bidder 
has failed to achieve levels of minority and women business enterprise participation as might be 
reasonable on the basis of objective data regarding availability and capacity of such businesses, the 
bidder shall be subject to an inquiry by the Office of Contract Compliance‖); See Plaintiff‘s Verified 
Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction and 
Damages, Jury Demand Endorsed Hereon, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. March 30, 2004) 2004 WL 3686803 (detailing City‘s response to inquiries about the 
inclusion of percentages for the availability of MBEs and WBEs for the drywall contract by arguing, 
―[T]he City of Cincinnati‘s Disparity Study found that Minorities and Females were underutilized in city 
contracting projects . . . .  The minority and female business owner would also have to be certified with 
the City as a Small Business Enterprise.  If the availability estimates are not met, it does not mean that 
the bid will be deemed non-responsive.  However, we expect the utilization of SBEs to be reflective of 
the availability estimates.‖). 
 39. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37. 
 40. Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint, supra note 38, at Exhibit B. 
8
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exceeded SO availability estimates, a bid from Cleveland 
Construction, Inc. with 10% SBE participation that failed to meet the 
SO availability estimates, and a bid by Kite, Inc. with 0% SBE 
participation that failed to meet the SO availability estimates.
41
  
Because none of the bids met the 35% SBE requirement, all the bids 
were rejected and the contract was rebid.
42
 
Valley, Cleveland Construction, and Kite all submitted new bids.  
Valley‘s second bid of $10,135,022 met the 35% SBE requirement 
while Cleveland Construction‘s second bid of $8,889,000 did not.  
Kite‘s second bid met the SBE requirement but was higher than both 
Valley‘s and Cleveland Construction‘s bids.
43
 
After the second round of bidding, Cincinnati awarded the contract 
to Valley.  Cleveland Construction subsequently filed suit alleging 
that the City‗s SO Program violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cleveland Construction further alleged 
that Cincinnati had impermissibly deprived Cleveland Construction 
of its constitutionally protected property interest in the contract by 
not enforcing CMC 321-37‘s price cap limitation, thereby violating 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
44
 
Cleveland moved for a temporary restraining order seeking to 
prevent Valley from performing the drywall work, but the trial court 
denied the motion.  Cincinnati then attempted to remove the case to 
federal court, but ultimately, the case was remanded back to state 
court.  Cleveland Construction elected to wait until after discovery to 




 41. Plaintiff‘s Verified Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, 
Permanent Injunction and Damages, Jury Demand Endorsed Hereon, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of 
Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. March 30, 2004) 2004 WL 3686803. 
 42. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-43 (providing the City discretion to ―reject any 
bid for any reason or all bids for no reason‖); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37 
(explaining that contract should be awarded to ―lowest and best bid‖). 
 43. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (Ohio 2008). 
 44. Entry at 1, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
July 13, 2005) 2005 WL 4927190 (describing how Cleveland sought lost profits on the contract under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, declarative judgment that the SO Program was unconstitutional, injunctive relief to 
prohibit the city from using the SO Program insofar as the Program used racial and gender 
classifications, injunctive relief to prevent Valley from performing the contract, and attorney‘s fees and 
court costs). 
 45. Entry Denying Defendant‘s Motions for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion 
9
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The trial court next entered a directed verdict for Cincinnati on the 
issue of lost profits on the due process claim.  The court also 
dismissed the jury and had remaining claims tried by the bench.
46
  
The trial court ruled in favor of Cleveland Construction on its due 
process claims, holding that Cincinnati had abused its discretion 
because it had awarded the bid to Valley even though Valley‘s bid 
was more than $50,000 higher than Cleveland‘s.
47
  The trial court 
also entered declaratory judgment against the city‘s SO Program for 
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and enjoined Cincinnati from using the SO Program.  The court, 
however, held that Cleveland Construction was not entitled to 
damages on its equal protection claim because Cincinnati rejected 
Cleveland Construction‘s bid for failure to meet Cincinnati‘s 
permissible SBE requirement and not for failure to meet the city‘s 
unconstitutional SO requirement.
48
  Finally, the court refused to 
enjoin Valley from performing under the contract.
49
  The court then 
awarded Cleveland Construction $433,290 in attorney‘s fees.
50
 
Both parties appealed.  Cincinnati argued that the trial court had 
erred on several grounds, including: (1) finding that Cincinnati 
violated Cleveland Construction‘s due process rights because the trial 
court had improperly applied CMC 321-37, (2) finding the SO 
program created impermissible race- and gender-based classifications 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and (3) awarding 
attorney‘s fees.  Cleveland, on the other hand, argued that the trial 
court had erred by entering a directed verdict for Cincinnati on the 
issues of (1) lost profits, (2) refusing to declare the Valley‘s contract 
 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 
No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 13, 2005). 
 46. Entry at 1, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
July 13, 2005) 2005 WL 4927190 (ruling that Cleveland Construction was not entitled to lost profits on 
its Due Process claim following the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in Cementech v. Fairlawn, 849 
N.E.2d 24 (Ohio 2006), in which the court held that a disappointed bidder was not entitled to recover 
lost profits when a municipality violated the bidder‘s due process rights in not awarding the contract).  
 47. Entry, supra note 46, at 5. 
 48. Id. at 9 (describing how the City maintained that the SO Program was not subject to strict 
scrutiny but stipulated that the SO Program would not survive if it were subject to strict scrutiny). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 13 
10
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void, and denying its motion for a new trial.
51
  The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s directed verdict on the 
issue of lost profits for the due process claims and the denial of a new 
trial, affirmed the rest of the trial court‘s decision, and remanded the 
case for a new trial on lost profits.
52
 
Cincinnati appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio with five 
propositions of law: (1) that a disappointed bidder does not have a 
constitutionally protected property interest in a public contract; (2) 
that to prove deprivation of procedural due process rights, a 
disappointed bidder must establish that the government entity did not 
provide sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard; (3) that a 
disappointed bidder ―cannot recover lost profits in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 
action for deprivation of procedural due process‖;
53
 (4) that a plaintiff 
does not have standing to seek an injunction against the operation of 
a municipal corporation unless the plaintiff pleads imminent injury in 
fact; and (5) that a subcontracting outreach program is not 
impermissibly race-based or gender-based when all bidders have an 
equal opportunity to comply with the subcontracting outreach 
program and the program does not create a preference.  The court 
granted discretionary review of propositions (1) and (3). 
The court never mentioned the city‘s SO Program or that CMC 
321-27‘s price cap limitation was meant only to apply to the SO 
Program.  Instead, the court simply held that a because the Cincinnati 
Municipal Code and the procurement forms all indicate that 
Cincinnati has wide discretion in awarding all contracts, the city did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding the contract to Valley, and 
therefore, Cleveland Construction did not have the constitutionally 
protected property interest necessary to prevail on a due process 
claim.
54
  Since Cleveland did not have a protected property interest, 
the court chose not to decide whether a disappointed bidder was 
 
 51. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 864 N.E.2d 116, 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
 52. Id. at 133–34 (explaining that the trial court erred on the issue of lost profits because the 
Ohio Supreme Court‘s holding in Cementech applied only to state law claims). 
 53. Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction by Defendant–Appellant City of Cincinnati at 7–14, 
City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., No. 07-0114 (Ohio July 16, 2007) 2007 OH S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 268. 
 54. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ohio 2008). 
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entitled to lost profits in a § 1983 action.  According to the court, 
―[t]he judgment of the court of appeals is therefore reversed, and 
judgment is entered for the city.‖
55
  Cleveland Construction 
recognized that the Supreme Court of Ohio had not issued a remand 
order and moved for reconsideration and clarification.
56




Cleveland returned to the trial court to set a trial date for lost 
profits on its equal protection claim, which Cleveland argued 
survived the court‘s decision since the court did not accept the issue 
for review, and the issue had last been remanded by the court of 
appeals for a new trial.
58
  The court denied the motion and entered 




Cleveland appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  Prior to 
the hearing, however, Cleveland sought to have Judge Mallory 
removed from the case because his brother, Mark Mallory, is the 
Mayor of Cincinnati.
60
  Justice Pfeifer rejected Cleveland‘s Affidavit 
of Disqualification, but in doing so he noted: 
[T]he apparent confusion among the parties regarding what matters are at 
issue before Judge Mallory and the other judges on the appellate panel.  
Judge Mallory and the attorneys for Cleveland Construction and the City 
of Cincinnati disagree as to the exact issues that remain for the court of 
appeals to resolve.  This confusion stems, no doubt, from the various 
ruling of the trial court, the court of appeals in the first appeal, and this 
Court [sic].  Nevertheless, although it is not entirely clear whether 
Cleveland Construction‘s equal protection claim is still alive or was 
extinguished by these prior rulings, that question is not dispositive for 
 
 55. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).  
 56. OHIO APP. R. 26 (2010).  
 57. Reconsideration Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 2007-0114 (Ohio 
Aug. 8, 2008). 
 58. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 864 N.E.2d 116, 122-23 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
 59. Entry Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion to Set a Trial Date and Entering Judgment for Defendant 
City of Cincinnati, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. May 
18, 2009) (denying motion for new trial). 
 60. Judgment Entry at 2, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-0900419; 10-AP-
012 (Ohio April 21, 2010) (denying the disqualification of Judge Mallory). 
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purposes of this affidavit-of-disqualification proceeding.
61
 
Thus, the court of appeals was set for its second hearing on 
Cleveland Construction. 
The court of appeals noted that Cleveland had argued in its motion 
for reconsideration that the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision 
appeared to enter judgment for Cincinnati on all claims, but that the 
equal protection claim had not been accepted for review. Therefore, 
the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and 
entered judgment for Cincinnati.
62
  Cleveland Construction appealed 




A. Dude, Where’s My Claim? 
Cleveland‘s equal protection claim effectively disappeared.  After 
the first appeal, Cleveland was awaiting a trial on damages for its 
equal protection and due process claims.  When the Supreme Court 
of Ohio granted certiorari, Cleveland could have expected, at worst, 
to lose its due process claim but still sit for trial on the equal 
protection claim.  Yet, despite never arguing the merits of the equal 
protection claim in front of the court, judgment was entered against 
Cleveland on that claim. 
There is no doubt that the second decisions of the trial court and 
the appeals court were both correct.  Under the law of the case 
doctrine, lower courts do not have the authority to exceed the 
mandate of a superior court, even if the decision is wrong.
64
  At the 
same time, a remand order is only issued by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio when it does so expressly.
65
  Therefore, when the court orders 
―judgment for the city,‖ and does not issue a remand order, then the 
 
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. Judgment Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-090419 (Ohio Ct. App. 
April 30, 2010). 
 63. Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 2010-1019 (Ohio Sept. 29, 2010) 
(declining jurisdiction). 
 64. State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 741 N.E.2d 127, 128 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam). 
 65. State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 201–02 (Ohio 2003). 
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trial court is bound to enter judgment and no more.  Similarly, the 
court of appeals is bound by the Court‘s mandate and can do nothing 
to reverse the decision of the trial court. 
Of course, the Supreme Court of Ohio did not exceed its authority 
by entering judgment for Cincinnati.  According to Ohio Supreme 
Court Practice Rule 3.6, when the court accepts ―a case public or 
great general interest‖ for review, the court may ―order the case or 
limited issues in the case to be briefed and heard on the merits or 
enter judgment summarily.‖
66
  Rule 3.6 does not require the court to 
hear any issue in a case before granting judgment.
67
  Therefore, the 
court can, at its prerogative, enter judgment without hearing an issue.  
Thus, the lower courts did not make Cleveland‘s equal protection 
claims disappear. 
B. Poorly Conceived Decision 
If the lower courts were not Harry Houdini, then the Supreme 
Court must have been.  But was the trick a sleight of hand or a slip of 
the tongue?  In other words, did the court perceive an equal 
protection claim that it saw as frivolous and make it disappear, or did 
the court intend only to reiterate a recent holding
68
 but inadvertently 
banish Cleveland‘s equal protection claim to the nether world along 
with the due process claim? 
Several factors point toward the court using an intentional sleight 
of hand.  First, the court was aware of the equal protection claim; one 
of Cincinnati‘s propositions of law, albeit one not accepted for 
review, dealt with equal protection issues.  Second, Cleveland asked 
the court for clarification to prevent losing its equal protection 
argument.  Finally, if the court inadvertently destroyed Cleveland‘s 
equal protection claim, it could have granted review a second time 
 
 66. OHIO S. CT. PRACTICE R. 3.6 (emphasis added). 
 67. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (providing full text of relevant provisions).  Note 
that the Court may both decline jurisdiction or ―[g]rant jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits, 
accepting the appeal, and . . . enter judgment summarily.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  In other words, once 
the Court has granted jurisdiction it may ―either order the case or limited issues in the case to be briefed 
and heard on the merits or,‖ instead of ordering the case to be briefed and heard, enter judgment.  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 68. Cementech, Inc. v. Fairlawn, 849 N.E.2d 24, 27–28 (Ohio 2006). 
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On the other hand, the opinion itself gives no indication that the 
court considered the equal protection claim.  For instance, the court 
did not address relevant Cincinnati Municipal Code provision CMC 
321-37(c)(4), which provides: 
In the event that the selection of the lowest and best bidder is based 
primarily upon the [SO requirements], the contract award may be made 
subject to the following limitation: the bid may not exceed an otherwise 
qualified bid by ten (10%) percent or Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000.00), whichever is lower.
70
 
The court conflated the SBE and SO program, however, and held 
that the price cap limitation applies to the SBE Program.
71
  In fact, 
the court never discussed the difference between the SBE and SO 
Programs.  Instead, it interpreted CMC 321-37(c)(4) as a 
discretionary price cap.  According to the court, ―[t]he 
[interpretation], advanced by the city, is that Cincinnati Municipal 
Code 321-37(c)(4) is merely a limitation that the city may impose 
upon a contract at its discretion (‗the contract award may be made 
subject to‘ a cap).‖
72
 
Second, the court never mentioned Cleveland‘s equal protection 
claim.  It simply denied review of that claim and never mentioned it 
again.  Finally, Justice Pfeifer recognized the confusion in his 
judgment entry on Cleveland‘s Affidavit for Disqualification.  As 
noted above, Justice Pfeifer understood the confusion as stemming 
from the multitude of decisions from various courts.  According to 
Justice Pfeifer, Cleveland‘s Motion to Set Trial Date for Issues 
Remanded for New Trial ―is premised on its belief that there remains 
 
 69. An astute observer may realize that, had the Court granted certiorari a second time, the issue 
before the Court would have been whether the trial court improperly refused to set a date for trial on the 
equal protection claim, and so it would be improper for the Court to decide whether the equal protection 
claim still existed.  A more astute observer would realize that, under Cleveland Construction, the issue 
before the Court no longer limits what issues the Court decides. 
 70. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 321-37.  The quote should read, ―factors 3 or 4‖ in 
place of [SO Program]. Factor 3 is unrelated; it involves non-discrimination practices in hiring. Factor 
for is the SO Program, not the SBE Program. 
 71. City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ohio 2008). 
 72. Id. at 1071–72. 
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a viable damages claim stemming from the trail court‘s finding that 
the race- and gender-based classifications in Cincinnati‘s SBE 
Program violated equal protection.‖
73
 
However, given the subsequent procedure, it is best to assume that 
the court intentionally killed Cleveland‘s claim.  While the case‘s 
history provides strong arguments on both sides, it would have been 
intellectually dishonest of the court to deny Cleveland‘s motion for 
clarification or deny certiorari a second time if the court had 
inadvertently destroyed the equal protection claim.  It is better to 
believe that the court intentionally entered judgment for Cincinnati 
on all claims, rather than believe the court attempted to cover up a 
mistake by not clarifying its decision. 
C. They’re Making Another Sequel? 
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently denied certiorari on 
Cleveland‘s second appeal.
74
  But that was not the end of Cleveland‘s 
possible claims.  Originally, the trial court awarded Cleveland 
$433,000 in attorney‘s fees.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
award.
75
  Upon first review, the Supreme Court of Ohio did not 
accept this issue. 
As already discussed, the trial court denied Cleveland‘s Motion to 
Set a Date for Trial, the only issue before the court at the time.  
Similarly, in Cleveland‘s second appeal, the only issue before the 
First District Court of Appeals was whether the trial court improperly 
denied Cleveland‘s motion.  Thus, the courts have awarded 
Cleveland attorney‘s fees; and that award has never been vacated or 
reversed.  Cleveland could legitimately return to the trial court and 
demand its award.  It is unlikely, however, that Cleveland lost its 
equal protection claim, but that somehow it won the award of 
 
 73. Judgment Entry at 4, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-0900419; 10-AP-
012 (Ohio April 21, 2010).  Note that ―SBE Program‖ should read ―SO Program.‖ 
 74. Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 2010-1019 (Ohio Sept. 29, 2010) 
(denying jurisdiction). 
 75. Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 864 N.E.2d 116, 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) 
(―[W]e reverse the trial court‘s entry of a directed verdict . . . .  We remand the cause for new trial on the 
issue of liability and damages . . . .  In all other respects, the court‘s judgment is affirmed.‖). 
16
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attorney‘s fees.  Still, just because Cleveland will not retain the 
award does not mean that Cleveland‘s claim to the award is 
illegitimate.  
D Consistent Litigator: The Dilemma Apparent 
Returning to the discussion in Part IV.B, a reading of Cleveland 
Construction consistent with the court intentionally destroying 
Cleveland‘s equal protection claim and its award of attorney‘s fees is 
only possible under the following assumptions: (1) the court intended 
to rule on Cleveland‘s equal protection claim, even though it did not 
do so explicitly and did not accept the proposition of law for review 
and (2) Justice Pfeiffer was being coy when he said that the existence 
of the equal protection claim was the premise behind Cleveland‘s 
Motion to Set a Trial Date.
76
 
Just because the court did not accept Cleveland‘s equal protection 
claim for review does not mean that Cleveland and Cincinnati failed 
argue the point.  In fact, both parties argued the equal protection issue 
in their merit briefs.  In its merit brief, Cleveland claimed: 
[T]he undisputed facts establish that (1) the City based the drywall 
contract award on Valley‘s compliance with the subcontracting outreach 
percentages, and (2) Valley‘s bid exceeded the monetary cap of CMC 
321-37 [sic] by twenty-four times.  The City awarded the drywall contract 
to Valley, rather than Cleveland, and ignored the fact that it had no 
discretion under CMC 321-37 [sic], so it could achieve race and gender-
conscious subcontracting percentage goals that, at the time, were part of 
the City‘s SBE Program.  Both the trial court and the First District Court 
of Appeals determined that these goals violated the equal protection 
clause of the U.S. Constitution‘s 14th Amendment by encouraging and 
pressuring all bidders, including Cleveland, to discriminate based on race 





 76. Alternatively, Justice Pfeiffer could have been as confused as Cleveland, since he dissented 
in City of Cincinnati. 
 77. Merit Brief for Appellee-Respondent Cleveland Construction, Inc. at *3–*4, City of 
Cincinnati v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., No. 07-0114 (Ohio Sept. 4, 2007) 2007 OH S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
405 (alterations in original). 
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Cleveland continued later, ―[T]he equal protection violations were 
also obvious at that point because the City‘s program document, the 
SBE Rules and Guidelines, as well as the forms from the rules and 
Guidelines incorporated within the bid documents, stated racial goals 
and preferences on their face.‖
78
  Even though the court did not 
accept the equal protection issue for review, Cleveland at least 
presented the issue. 
Further, both parties included the opinions of the trial court and the 
court of appeals as appendices.  The trial court had found that, while 
Cincinnati‘s SO Program violated the Equal Protection Clause, 
Cleveland did not lose the contract because of the unconstitutional 
SO Program, but rather because of the constitutional SBE Program.  
In other words, the violation of Cleveland‘s equal protection rights 
did not damage Cleveland in any way.  According to the trial court, 
―Cleveland Construction failed to establish that Cincinnati‘s race and 
sex based [sic] classification (as opposed to Cincinnati‘s small 
business preference) resulted in the loss of the contract at issue.‖
79
  
The court of appeals reversed, but in doing so, the court never 
actually discussed the issue.  Instead, the court noted that Cleveland 
had appealed the trial court‘s finding on causation during a 
discussion of the directed verdict on the due process claim.
80
  Rather 
cryptically, the court of appeals sustained the assignment of error 
without even noting that it related to the equal protection, and not the 
due process, claim. 
Thus, the court may have understood Cleveland‘s equal protection 
claim was ultimately doomed.  No remand order would have changed 
the fact that Cincinnati awarded the contract to Valley because 
Valley met the permissible SBE requirements and Cleveland did not.  
Cleveland could not present evidence that Cincinnati never used the 
SO Guidelines, let alone present evidence that Cincinnati awarded 
the contract to Valley based on the SO Guidelines.  Consistent with 
all the material in the record and Cleveland‘s presentation of the 
 
 78. Id. at *29; see also id. at *33 n.111 (citing to the equal protection claim in W. H. Scott 
Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Jackson, 199 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 79. Final Judgment Entry, Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. A0402638 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. Aug. 19, 2005). 
 80. Cleveland Constr., 864 N.E.2d at 130–31. 
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equal protection issue in its merit brief, the court may have decided 
there was no need to remand the issue when Cleveland had no chance 
of success. 
Yet, the consistent reading makes the dilemma facing attorneys 
more apparent.  That is, attorneys have two options when the court 
accepts limited issues for discretionary review: (1) either argue the 
issues not accepted for review or (2) argue only the issues accepted 
for review.  Thus, the choice creates four outcomes an attorney can 
face in front of the Ohio Supreme Court.  If the attorney argues the 
unaccepted issues and the court does not decide the issues, then the 
attorney has wasted time and effort preparing the arguments.
81
  If the 
attorney argues the unaccepted issues and the court decides the 
issues, then the attorney may be in position to win the case, but, 
assuming both parties‘ argue unaccepted issues, there is an equal 
chance they will lose.  On the other hand, if the attorney does not 
argue unaccepted issues, and the court decides the issues, then the 
party is at risk of having the issue decided against them without ever 
giving an argument.
82
  At the same time, if the attorney acts 
reasonably and does not argue unaccepted issues, and the court does 
not decide the unaccepted issues, then the attorney is merely held 
even—the party neither gains nor loses anything.  Undoubtedly, this 
is the outcome in the vast majority of cases, but it may not always be 
the safest bet. 
Cleveland had a potential claim that was remanded by the court of 
appeals and not accepted for review by the court.  Comparably, the 
attorney‘s fees are a nominal amount considering Cleveland would, 
in effect, be making the exact argument it had already made before 
the court of appeals.  The cost of protecting against having the issue 
adversely decided without argument is well worth it, even though, in 




 81. And, in some cases, clients may be charged additional fees. 
 82. Alternately, the issue could be decided in their favor. 
 83. I grant, of course, that Cleveland hardly argued the issue before the court.  At most 
Cleveland presented the issue to the court.  Nonetheless, the author believes Cleveland would agree the 
cost of attorney‘s fees incurred while arguing the equal protection issue before the Court would have 
been well worth it, considering the City would have had to pay these costs had Cleveland ultimately 
prevailed. 
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E. The Solution 
The dilemma is not caused by the doctrine of law of the case; the 
real culprit is granting discretionary review on limited issues in a 
case.  In other words, Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 3.6(B)(3) is 
the problem.  The Rule provides: 
[I]f the appeal is a discretionary appeal asserting a question of public or 
great general interest, the Supreme court will either: (a) Decline 
jurisdiction to decide the case on the merits; or (b) Grant jurisdiction to 
hear the case on the merits, accepting the appeal, and either order the case 




The problem is with the practice of granting review of limited issues 
in a case, not the doctrine of the law of the case. 
This Casenote is not the first time that the practice of accepting 
limited issues has been criticized.  In Meyer v. United Parcel Service, 
Justice Pfeifer said: 
I disagree with this Court‘s [sic] practice of picking and choosing, within 
a case, the issues we are willing to review.  If a case is worthy of review, 
in the interests of providing justice to the parties and because, until we 
see the entire record, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the interplay 
of various issues, all appealed issues should be before us.
85
 
More recently, Justice Pfeifer claimed the Court had done away 
with limited reviews.  According to Justice Pfeifer, ―[a]pparently a 
majority of this Court [sic] now agrees with my dissent in Meyer 
because, even though this court accepted jurisdiction over [only one 
proposition of law], the majority opinion also addresses [the other 
unaccepted propositions of law].‖
86
 
But the process is not complete.  Even if the Justice Pfeifer is 
correct and the court no longer accepts limited issues for appeal, the 
court still claims it does and acts accordingly.  Justice Pfeifer 
 
 84. OHIO S. CT. PRAC. R. 3.6. 
 85. Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 N.E.2d 106, 118–19 (Ohio 2009) (Pfeiffer, J., 
dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 86. State ex rel. Associated Builders & Contrs. of Cent. Ohio v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Comm‘rs, 
926 N.E.2d 600, 610–11 (Ohio 2010) (Pfeiffer, J., dissenting). 
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continued: 
I do not disagree with that approach; in fact, I applaud it.  But wouldn‘t it 
be better for parties and their attorneys if this Court [sic] accepted 
jurisdiction without limitation?  The current practice is confusing.  
Attorneys don‘t know whether they should argue issues that aren‘t before 
us; based on this case, they should.  Attorneys also don‘t know whether 
they can safely ignore issues that we have told them are not before us; 
based on this case, they shouldn‘t.
87
 
Had Justice Pfeifer‘s warning come before the court accepted 
Cincinnati‘s appeal, Cleveland may have more fully argued its equal 
protection claim, perhaps resulting in a judgment entered in its 
favor.
88
  The Supreme Court of Ohio recognizes the dilemma; the 
question is whether the court will do anything to address it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In City of Cincinnati v. Cleveland Construction, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio exercised its discretion under Rule 3.6 and accepted 
only Cleveland‘s due process claim.  However, the court also 
exercised its discretion under Rule 3.6 to enter judgment summarily.  
In doing so, the law of the case doctrine dictates that the court 
destroyed Cleveland‘s equal protection claim without having ever 
heard arguments on the issue.  The practice of accepting only limited 
issues for discretionary review but then entering judgment on an 
entire case creates a dilemma for attorneys: either argue unaccepted 
issues or risk losing them.  The solution to the dilemma is simple—
the Supreme Court of Ohio should amend Ohio Supreme Court 
Practice Rule 3.6 to only allow for the acceptance of an entire case 
for review. 
 
 87. Id. (alteration in original). 
 88. Because the City had already stipulated that the SO Program would not survive strict 
scrutiny, if the Court had held that the SO Program was subject to strict scrutiny, there would have been 
no issues of fact or law regarding the equal protection claim left to decide. 
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